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Smart Home Alone: The World’s Gateway to More
Efficient Use of Energy and Mayhem
INTRODUCTION
The future is finally here; the possibility of automated toasters and
dishwashers is right around the corner. Currently, homes are undergoing
an amazing technological transformation—one aimed at making lives
more convenient and manageable. Perhaps the best part of this
transformation are the environmental benefits it provides, making each
home an efficient consumer of energy with little to no effort by its
inhabitants. Welcome to the world of the Internet of Things (IoT) and
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS),1 the technology behind this amazing
transformation. This particular technology has led to improvements in the
U.S.’s power grid2 and advances within our homes collectively known as
the “Smart Grid.”
The technology used to make homes “smarter” both helps consumers
save on their energy bills and reduce stress on the power grid. Modern
homes are outfitted with appliances like a smart thermostat, which learns
consumer habits and automatically adjusts the temperature of the home
based on factors including whether one is home, awake, or sleeping. This
technology also allows the smart thermostat to connect and control other
smart appliances in the home, including smart lamps, washers, and dryers.
Unfortunately, this technology has a dark side that has not been
sufficiently addressed. Looming issues involve the dangers that lurk when
consumers, industry leaders, and legislators leave the smart home alone.
Copyright 2017, by CHANSE J. BARNES
1. For a detailed discussion of the terms IoT and CPS, see infra Part I.B. There
is disagreement regarding the relationship between IoT and CPS. The three
possibilities include: (1) IoT is a form of CPS; (2) Both terms refer to the same concept
and are interchangeable; or (3) IoT and CPS are distinct but similar concepts. This
debate is outside the scope of this article, but this comment will treat IoT as a form of
CPS. See generally Ivan Sojmenovic, Machine-to-Machine Communications with InNetwork Data Aggregation, Processing, and Actuation for Large-Scale CyberPhysical Systems, 1 IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS J. 122 (2014), ieeexplore.ieee.org
/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6766661 [ https://perma.cc/P74P-LXC6 ]; Eric
Simmon et al., Designing a Cyber-Physical Cloud Computing Architecture, 17 IT
PROFESSIONAL 40 (2015), ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber
=7116443 [https://perma.cc/MXY7-U8XV]; David Sousa Nunes et al., Survey on
Human-in-the-Loop Applications Towards an Internet of All, 17 IEEE COMM.
SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 944 (2015), ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=
&arnumber=7029083 [https://perma.cc/G9MU-WGW3].
2. The power grid refers to the U.S. electricity delivery system, which generates
electricity and transmits it to customers. See STAN MARK KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R40511, ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES
1–2 (2009).
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Imagine that within the smart thermostat, which connects to all smart
devices synced to Wi-Fi in your home, the sensor device that determines
whether you are home malfunctions. That malfunction, which causes the
system to think no one is home, triggers the thermostat to turn off the entire
home. This occurs despite the fact that the homeowner is screaming at the
thermostat to turn the lights back on. The homeowner is now forced to
spend the evening in darkness because his home lacks the ability to
manually operate the light switches.
Now, imagine that all of these malfunctions have occurred because
someone hacked into the smart home; not a single device, but the entire
home. One hacker uses the smart thermostat to determine when the
homeowner is not home so he can plan the perfect time to snoop. Another
hacker is more nefarious and uses that same smart thermostat to connect
to your smart meter. That hacker uses your thermostat-meter connection
as a pathway into the Smart Grid itself. He manages to shut down the entire
power grid in the region just as that region is going through the worst
drought in its history. This means no water, no power, and no electricity.
Unfortunately, this hypothetical catastrophe is much more possible than
one may first assume.
Modernizing the power grid and homes through IoT and CPS
increases the connectivity of many devices which creates pathways for
cyber attack. Thus, the continued development of the grid undermines
important security concerns that must be considered in preventing a kinetic
cyber attack, such as the one presented in the hypothetical above. Any
progress made in addressing these concerns will be undone by the
inadequate security of smart devices in the home and insufficient oversight
by technological developers. The weakest link in the current Smart Grid
infrastructure, the “smart home,” must become a priority for Smart Grid
policy makers in developing a more secure power grid. Such a priority
requires more direction and control over developers and service providers
involved in the smart home. Securing the smart home will be crucial for
security of the entire power grid.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the current
regulatory environment, explains the technology behind the Smart Grid
and the smart home, and details the new business developing around the
smart home. Part II discusses how the security risks associated with IoT
and CPS technology can lead to an attack, not only of the home, but on the
power grid as a whole. Part III analyzes how the current regulatory regime
fails to adequately address important issues related to the security of the
smart home. In light of those issues, Part IV presents a solution to make
smart home security a priority in the continuing development of the Smart
Grid.

2017]

SMART HOME ALONE

367

I. BACKGROUND
Although poorly defined, the Smart Grid can best be understood as
“an intelligent energy platform . . . that permits the integration of a wide
variety of new applications into the power grid.”3 More concretely, the
Smart Grid is the continuing evolution of an electrical power grid that
involves implementing various technologies on current or traditional grid
infrastructure in an effort to promote more efficient generation,
distribution, and use of energy.4 The new Smart Grid is being built upon
the traditional grid infrastructure in a technical and legal sense.5 The Smart
Grid also represents a convergence of energy and telecommunications in
technology and policy6 and includes many benefits.7
The Smart Grid’s infrastructure consists of four parts: (1) power
generation; (2) transmission; (3) distribution; and (4) end-use.8 The smart
home represents the “end-use” portion of the infrastructure.9 Although illdefined like the Smart Grid, the smart home can be understood as the
aggregate of the technological improvements and advancements being
made in the traditional home.10 The smart home is very important to the
Smart Grid infrastructure for many reasons, particularly because of the
smart home’s role in the Smart Grid’s advanced metering infrastructure.11

3. H. Russell Frisby, Jr. & Jonathan P. Trotta, The Smart Grid: The
Complexities and Importance of Data Privacy and Security, 19 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 297, 301 (2011).
4. See, e.g., id.; Symposium, Cyber-Physical Systems: A Security Perspective,
2015 20th IEEE European (2015) [hereinafter Security Perspective].
5. Christopher Bosch, Note, Securing the Smart Grid: Protecting National
Security and Privacy Through Mandatory, Enforceable Interoperability
Standards, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1349, 1354 (2015). The infrastructure and
regulatory environment of the power grid, as it existed prior to recent Smart Grid
modernization efforts, serves as the foundation for its continued development. Id.
6. Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 299.
7. Smart Grid benefits include: (1) helping integrate renewable resources;
(2) allowing for communication of “near-real-time consumption information”
between utilities and consumers; (3) allowing the grid to “sense problems quickly
and respond effectively;” (4) adjusting to “variations in output by drawing energy
from other sources when needed;” and (5) allowing for advanced energy storage
practices which means “energy can be stored for later consumption when it is least
expensive to generate, allowing for reduced peak loads.” Bosch, supra note 5, at
1358–61.
8. Security Perspective, supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. Id. (stating that the home, like the grid, is also categorized by a shift
“towards the integration of intelligent control systems”).
11. For a detailed discussion of the advanced metering infrastructure, see
infra Part I.C.
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Industry leaders and Smart Grid regulators are pushing for greater
interoperability12 within the Smart Grid. Although greater interoperability
would be beneficial, if unchecked, this policy will lead to a kinetic cyber
attack. Kinetic attacks “us[e] weapons that rely on energy—blast, heat,
and fragmentation, for example—to cause their damage.”13 A kinetic
cyber attack uses cyber means14 to effect a kinetic attack.15 A kinetic attack
can be so severe that it leads to “an industry-defined Severe Event, namely
one so damaging that afterwards the electricity services remain degraded
for months or years.”16 The risk of a kinetic cyber attack on the grid is
already real,17 but unchecked development of the smart home will only
increase the danger of this national security threat. Comprehending the risk
of a kinetic cyber attack requires an understanding of the technology
behind the smart home and the Smart Grid, primarily the concepts of CPS
and IoT. Analysis of the threat of kinetic cyber attack also requires an
examination of how the new business that is developing around the home
coupled with the current state of Smart Grid regulation contributes to this
risk.
A. The Current Regulatory Environment
Compared to the rapid technological growth of the power grid,
regulatory change has been rather sluggish. Regulation of the grid involves

12. Interoperability is defined infra Part I.A.2.
13. Roland L. Trope et al., Article: Before Rolling Blackouts Begin: Briefing
Boards on Cyber Attacks That Target and Degrade the Grid, 40 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 647, 652 n.12 (2014). CPS and IoT are important to the evolution of the power
grid and the home because they impact society, the economy, and the environment.
See Security Perspective, supra note 4. Society is more aware of the planet’s limited
resources, and CPS and IoT help make important physical processes more efficient.
Kyoung-Dae Kim & P.R. Kumar, Cyber-Physical Systems: A Perspective at the
Centennial, 100 PROC. OF THE IEEE, 1287 (2012), ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp
.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6176187 [https://perma.cc/H8YL-H5VW]; Ahmad-Reza
Sadeghi et al., Security and Privacy Challenges in Industrial Internet of Things, 52
Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Design Automation Conference 1 (2015). For
example, CPS and IoT influence energy consumption in the home and, more
generally, energy generation and distribution for the grid.
14. Use of communication pathways serve as an example of “cyber means.” See
SCOTT D. APPLEGATE, THE DAWN OF KINETIC CYBER 1, 6 (2013), ccdcoe.org/cycon
/2013/proceedings/d2r1s4_applegate.pdf [ https://perma.cc/89TC].
15. See Trope et al., supra note 13, at 652–54.
16. Id. at 652–53.
17. See APPLEGATE, supra note 14, at 2 (“Generally, the main targets for
kinetic cyber attacks are cyber physical systems”).
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multiple jurisdictions,18 but it is still primarily governed by two primary
actors: the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and individual
state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs). With this federal and state
division, and the complexity of energy regulation, the current regulatory
regime is unequipped to handle the evolution of the power grid,
specifically the creation of communication networks that transcend state
lines.
1. The Important Actors: FERC and State PUCs
The most important actors in the current regulatory landscape are
PUCs and FERC. PUCs regulate retail sales of electricity and distribution
services.19 FERC has regulatory authority over the interstate wholesale of
electricity and interstate transmission of electricity.20 FERC also has the
authority to enforce reliability standards for the bulk power system.21 The
PUCs’ ability to regulate is seen as a natural exercise of state power,
whereas the federal government’s limited ability to regulate is an exercise
of Congress’ Commerce Power.22 The Federal Power Act (FPA),23 the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct),24 and the Energy Independence and
Security Act (EISA)25 together establish FERC’s jurisdictional authority.
2. Current Federal Legislation
Because they establish FERC’s jurisdiction over the Smart Grid, the
FPA, the EPAct, and EISA represent the most relevant federal legislation
for this Comment. The FPA establishes FERC’s authority to regulate
“matters relating to generation,” the interstate transmission, and the
18. Federal, state, and local actors are all involved at some stage of Smart Grid
regulation. Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2013) (“Both the states and the federal government
have jurisdiction over parts of the Smart Grid. Depending on which part of the system
is involved, either FERC, a state PUC, or the governing council or board of a
municipal or cooperative utility has jurisdiction.”).
19. Id. at 17.
20. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 824o. The bulk power system includes “facilities and control
systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission
network” and “electric energy from generation facilities needed to maintain
transmission system reliability.” 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(1)(A)-(B).
22. Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 92 F.2d 580, 588 (2d Cir.
1937) (“Congress has paramount authority to regulate the transmission or sale for
transmission of gas and electric energy across state borders.”), aff’d, 303 U.S. 419
(1938).
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–823(d) (2012).
24. The relevant portion of this Act can be found at 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012).
25. Energy Independence and Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 17001–17386 (2007).

370

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. V

interstate sale of energy at wholesale.26 FERC’s authority to create
mandatory reliability standards is established under the EPAct.27 Facilities
used in the local distribution of electricity are specifically excluded from
FERC’s authority and remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
states.28
Reliability standards provide for, among other things, cyber security
protection.29 FERC works with the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) to create these reliability standards.30 Although,
NERC develops the standards, FERC must approve the standards in full
for the standard to be given regulatory effect.31 Furthermore, FERC can
only approve a proposed standard if it determines that the standard is “just,
reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public
interest.”32
EISA represents the federal government’s policy to support the
adoption of Smart Grid technologies throughout the nation.33 In achieving
this goal, EISA encourages the development of interoperability standards
that are “technologically neutral and sufficiently flexible.”34
Interoperability deals with the communication paths between devices and
other actors in the Smart Grid infrastructure. Therefore, the goal of
developing interoperability standards is to create a “language” that all
devices speak regardless of the manufacturer, so that the entire grid
infrastructure works properly.35 Interoperability is an important goal for
Smart Grid success, but it does not encompass all of the issues surrounding
communication.36

26. 16 U.S.C. § 824.
27. “Reliability standards” are standards for “existing bulk-power systems
and facilities, including cybersecurity protection, and the design of planned
additions or modifications to such facilities.” 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(3).
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(1).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(3).
30. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1378. NERC is an international, not-for-profit
institution of users and operators of the bulk-power system. See, e.g., id.; About NERC,
NERC, nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/X2UR-VVDF ]
(last visited Feb. 21, 2017). NERC is the Electric Reliability Organization that was
certified by FERC in 2006 pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(2)’s requirement. See
About NERC, NERC, nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc
/X2UR-VVDF] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(2) and (c).
31. See 16 U.S.C. § 824o(d).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 824o(d)(2).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 17381 (2012).
34. Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 308.
35. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1380.
36. See discussion infra Part II.A (detailing issues of two-way communication).
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EISA gave the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
the responsibility for creating interoperability standards.37 In developing
these standards, FERC named with six priorities, including cyber
security.38 NIST accepted FERC’s priorities with the addition of two more
priorities.39 The process of developing interoperability standards gives the
responsibility to NIST to work with federal and state agencies, along with
private organizations to develop interoperability standards.40 NIST then
presents these standards to FERC for approval, and if FERC comes to a
“sufficient consensus,”41 it will adopt them.42 However, the process for
creating these standards has proven ineffective, as only voluntary
standards have developed.43
3. Other Federal Actors
EISA also affects other entities in the development of the Smart Grid.
EISA charges the Department of Energy (DOE) with the obligation of
creating multiple entities dedicated to research, development, and
organizing the efforts of other entities in one form or another.44 The first
of these obligations is to create the Smart Grid Advisory Committee,
37. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1379–80. In the interoperability standard
development process, NIST has the primary responsibility of coming up with the
standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 17385. NIST not only works with FERC to develop
interoperability standards, but also works with the DOE’s OEDER, SGTF, SGAC,
and “other relevant Federal and state agencies.” Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at
308.
38. The complete list of the six priorities are: (1) system security (i.e.,
cybersecurity); (2) inter-system communication and coordination; (3) wide are
situational awareness; (4) demand response; (5) electric storage; and (6) electric
transportation. See Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 37098–37101(Jul. 27, 2009)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. chap. I).
39. These additional priorities are automation of advanced metering and
automation of distribution systems. Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 311.
40. Some of these private organizations include: GridWise Architecture
Council, the International Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation, and the National Electrical
Manufacturer’s Association. 42 U.S.C. § 17385(a)(2).
41. This term was not defined by Congress and is an issue in the entire
adoption process of interoperability standards. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1380.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 17385(d). The enforceability of standards that have been
adopted has been questioned. See Bosch, supra note 5, at 1380.
43. See infra Part III.B.
44. EISA also charges DOE with the primary responsibility of “funding
Smart Grid research and development efforts, as well as regional demonstration
projects to exhibit the potential benefits of Smart Grid investments.” See Frisby
& Trotta, supra note 3, at 306; 42 U.S.C. § 17384(b). DOE is also responsible for
“developing and establishing procedures for Smart Grid Investment grants.”
Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 306.
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whose purpose is to advise DOE and other relevant federal entities about
the ongoing evolution of interoperability standards within the Smart
Grid.45 EISA also charges DOE with creating the Smart Grid Task Force
(SGTF).46 The SGTF is tasked with overseeing the traditional power grid’s
transition into the Smart Grid.47 The scope of SGTF’s responsibility
includes carefully studying key interactions on the grid.48 Most notable is
oversight of interactions between Smart Grid technology, utility
regulation, and system security.
With regard to the states, “EISA creat[ed] two new standards for state
regulatory commission consideration under Title I of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act,”49 including: (1) demonstrating consideration of
adopting Smart Grid technology, and (2) necessity of states to come up
with cost recovery methods for Smart Grid development.
B. CPS and IoT: Gateway to the Future
Grasping the deficiencies of the current regulatory environment
requires an understanding of the technology behind the Smart Grid: CPS
and IoT. CPS does not have a single, mutual definition,50 but, in an abstract
sense, it is a system that creates a bridge between the cyber-world and the
physical world.51 This bridge is created through a system of embedded

45. See Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 306.
46. SGTF “consists of representatives from DOE’s Office of Electric Delivery
and Energy Reliability (OEDER).” Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 309 n. 62.
50. Although the term CPS is fairly new, CPS can be understood as a
continuation of a series of technological advancements. Kim & Kumar, supra note 13.
Thus, CPS has been referred to as the “next generation of engineered systems.” Id. An
engineered system is “a combination of components that work in synergy to
collectively perform a useful function.” What’s an Engineered System, ENG’G
RESEARCH CENTERS, erc-assoc.org/content/what%E2%80%99s-engineered-system
[https://perma.cc/B5WV-FY75] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). The Massachusetts
Institute of Technology defines an engineering system in two ways, the relevant
definition for this comment being: “a class of systems characterized by a high degree
of technical complexity, social intricacy, and elaborate processes, aimed at fulfilling
important functions in society. Such systems include electrical grids, transportation,
manufacturing supply chains, and health care delivery.” Engineering Systems FAQs,
MIT ENG’G SYS. DIV., esd.mit.edu/about/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/RU2Q-42JA]
(last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
51. Ragunathan Rajkumar et al., Cyber-Physical Systems: The Next Computing
Revolution, 2010 47th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC) 731
(2010), ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5523280 [https://perma
.cc/J937-6BF5].
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devices that control and interact with the physical environment.52 These
devices represent an integration of computation, communication, and
control.53 Particularly important to the Smart Grid and the smart home is
real-time computation54 and communication networks.55 Together with
sensing technology, CPS devices are able to collect data about the physical
environment, share that data with other interconnected devices on the same
network, and eventually affect the physical environment.56
Likewise, the growing phenomenon of IoT can also impact the
environment.57 IoT shares many characteristics with CPS and can even be
considered a form of CPS.58 Similar to CPS, IoT is a network made up of
physical objects embedded with communicating, sensing, measuring, and

52. An embedded device is an object that has been incorporated with
technology, giving the object the ability to perform functions that would otherwise
be provided by separate, independent software. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S
TELECOM DICTIONARY 470, 1149 (28th ed. 2014). An embedded device can either
be fixed in design to perform one specific application, or it can be programmable
to perform multiple or general functions. Id. at 470. An example of a device with
a fixed design would be a controller on a fan that has fixed speeds. Conversely, a
smart phone is an example of a general purpose device that is programmable.
53. Rajkumar et al., supra note 51. Communication is “the transmission of data
from one computer to another, or from one device to another.” Communications,
WEBOPEDIA, webopedia.com/TERM/C/communications.html [https://perma.cc
] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
/D2T754. See infra Part I.C. Real-time computation involves scheduling computational
tasks so that they are completed before a deadline. See Kim & Kumar, supra note 13,
at 1288.
55. See Kim & Kumar, supra note 13, at 1302. Communication and real-time
computation technology contribute to more efficient use and more responsive and
reliable energy production and distribution. For a more detailed discussion of how
communication and real-time computation affect the Smart Grid and Smart home,
see infra Part I.C.
56. Kim & Kumar, supra note 13, at 1288.
57. IoT is experiencing rapid growth because of its increased use in familiar
consumer objects, such as our cellular phones. Scott R. Peppet, Article: Regulating
the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy,
Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 90–91 (2014) (Quoting the now former
FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, “On the Internet of Things, consumers are going to
start having devices, whether it’s their car, or some other tool that they have, that’s
connected and sending information to a number of different entities, and the consumer
might not even realize that they have a connected device of that the thing that they’re
using is collecting information about them.”). IoT consumer devices are now more
feasible due to the decrease in cost to produce the necessary technology. See id. at 98
(stating that the cost of sensors used in IoT devices has decreased from twenty-five
dollars per unit to less than one dollar per unit allowing the sensors to be “incorporated
into consumer products available at scale.”).
58. See supra note 1.
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computing technology.59 One of the more important aspects of IoT
technology is Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) sensors.60
MEMS sensors are embedded in physical objects and allow the embedded
device to “translate physical phenomenon, such as movement, heat,
pressure, or location into digital information.”61 By connecting embedded
devices to the Internet, the devices are able to communicate, or transfer,
this digital information with data centers.62 The data centers interpret the
data it receives, and then sends back more data to the device, allowing the
device to react to the environment.63 Altogether, this makes a “giant
network of connected ‘things’”64 that connects “people [to] people, people
[to] things, and things [to] things,”65 illustrating another aspect where
communication is critical.
C. Change is Coming: How IoT and CPS are Reshaping the Energy
Industry
The Smart Grid’s entire infrastructure represents a large scale CPS,
while the smart home represents a medium scale CPS.66 Effectively, the
Smart Grid and smart home will share many benefits and disadvantages as
a CPS.67 Generally, the development of the power grid into a modern CPS
can make the important physical processes68 of the grid cleaner, more
efficient, and cost-effective.69 Better CPS technology is also important in
preventing many other problems, such as blackouts.70
The benefits of CPS and IoT technology are implicated in many areas.
CPS technology allows for Distributed Energy Resource technologies, like
wind or solar power, to be more effectively used in the Power Grid.71
59. See, e.g., Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things,’
FORBES (May 13, 2014, 12:05 AM), forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13
/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/ [https://perma.cc
]; Kim & Kumar, supra note 13, at 1289; NEWTON, supra note 52, at
/F3GC664.
60. The use of IoT technology in consumer devices has become more
practical due to the reduced cost of producing these types of sensors. Peppet,
supra note 57, at 98 & n. 52.
61. Id. at 98.
62. See NEWTON, supra note 52, at 690.
63. Id.
64. Morgan, supra at 59.
65. Id.
66. Security Perspective, supra note 4.
67. See id.
68. These processes are: power generation, transmission, distribution, and
consumption (or end use). Id.
69. Kim & Kumar, supra note 13, at 1302.
70. Rajkumar et al., supra note 51.
71. Kim & Kumar, supra note 13, at 1302.
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Illustrating the point, consumers with solar panels can produce energy for
their homes or sell that same energy back to their utility company.72 In
addition, alternative energy sources can be stored when produced but not
needed, or they can alternatively be redirected to other points in the grid.73
For example, if a home has solar panels and those panels produce more
energy than the home needs, that energy can be redirected to a neighbor’s
home.74 This is all made possible, in part, because of the communication
and information technology present in CPS that “allow[s] the grid to
engage in bidirectional flow of information and electricity” from utility to
customer and vice versa.75
The benefits of CPS and IoT technology can also be obtained through
real-time computing and networking in the smart home. Real-time
computation benefits the power grid because it can make distribution of
energy more responsive by communicating to the grid how much power is
actually needed in a certain home.76 Real-time computation also affects
the end-use of energy by making energy consumption cheaper and more
efficient for consumers. The advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)
represents how this computation, communication, and control technology
work together.77 The AMI works through the installation of smart meters78
on consumers’ homes.79 These smart meters communicate with each other,
the utility company, and those smart appliances located in the consumer’s
home.80 Since electricity consumers are charged more for energy
consumption during peak load times, the AMI assists consumers in
avoiding consumption during peak times and provides them with real-time
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (“Thanks to the infrastructure and mechanisms for bidirectional
exchange of information and electricity, Smart Grid also allows traditional electric
energy consumers to become providers. Electric energy that is stored or generated
at residential and industrial facilities from renewable energy sources such as wind
and solar can be sold to other consumers in the neighborhood or electric power
providers.”).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The AMI describes how the smart meters communicate and transmit
meter data to the utility at “regular intervals.” U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2014
SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT (2014) [hereinafter SMART GRID REPORT]; Peppet,
supra note 57, at 109 (“The home is increasingly monitored via sensors in a
second way as well: the smart electricity grid.”).
78. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1357 (A smart meter is a device that uses “digital
technology to record customer consumption information on a frequent basis.”).
79. Yang Liu et al., Vulnerability Assessment and Defense Technology for Smart
Home Cybersecurity Considering Pricing Cyberattacks, IEEE/ACM Int’l Conf. on
Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD) (2014), ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp
?arnumber=7001350 [ https://perma.cc/T4KZ].
80. Id.
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pricing information from the utility company.81 The smart meters use the
pricing data provided to “schedule” energy consumption of smart
appliances within the home, and also to record energy consumption.82 The
reduced consumption during peak load times reduces the consumer’s
electricity bill, the amount of electricity needed in the grid, and, ultimately,
stress on the entire system.83 The AMI is just one example of how
beneficial end-use controls are in the Smart Grid infrastructure.
D. The New Kids in Town: Edge Services and Edge Service Providers
Smart Grid development has led to new businesses and services84 that
are changing the structure of the energy industry. These new services,
termed “edge services,”85 have opened the door for entities not
traditionally involved in the power grid to provide new services to
customers.86 Edge services are services, or products, that are provided to
end-use consumers, specifically those in the smart home.87 The benefits of
these services range from greater control over appliances, resulting in
greater control over energy bills, to consumer participation in programs
that promote competition in the energy market.88 However, this comment
primarily focuses on the development of smart appliances.89 An edge

81. Kim & Kumar, supra note 13, at 1302.
82. Smart meters also perform the traditional function of recording energy
consumption. See Liu et al., supra note 79.
83. This reduction in stress and the benefits it can produce are illustrated in
the 2014 Smart Grid System Report produced by the Department of Energy
(DOE). In the report, it was noted that the AMI infrastructure reduced peak
demand of electricity to an extent that the Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company
may potentially be able to avoid building a new power plant due to the addition
of customer-based technologies, like a communicating thermostat. SMART GRID
REPORT, supra note 77, at 6.
84. “New third-party market entrants [that] will strategically position
themselves between the customer and the utility, resulting in what has been
termed ‘customer disintermediation’—an occurrence in which vendors offer
attractive energy products and services to customers that will allow customers to
bypass their local utility.” Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 301.
85. ELIAS LEAKE QUINN, SMART METERING & PRIVACY: EXISTING LAW AND
COMPETING POLICIES,A REPORT FOR THE COLORADO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
4 (2009).
86. See id.
87. Id. (defining edge services as those that are “provided to the electric
consumer or that are focused on the last mile of electricity distribution”).
88. Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 303.
89. A type of edge service that can “tap into price signals sent from the
electric utility and allow consumers to automate their appliance use depending on
electricity costs.” QUINN, supra note 85, at B–3.
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service provider (ESP) can be an electric and gas utility company, a third
party,90 or even a traditional customer.91
The world has seen a proliferation of companies take advantage of the
IoT consumer market to provide edge services. For example, General
Electric and Whirlpool provide a variety of smart appliances, including
washers, dryers, and refrigerators.92 Many entities are working on ways to
improve communication and connectivity among these devices.93 Nest,
which developed the popular Nest Smart Thermostat, provides a model of
a smart appliance that has the desired effective communication
capabilities. Recently acquired by Google in January 2014,94 some view
the acquisition of Nest as establishing credibility in the IoT market.95
While IoT’s goals are not primarily about energy efficiency, many
scholars believe energy efficiency will begin to have a bigger influence on
the market.96 Thus, the energy field will likely see more ESPs in the market
very soon. This development, although beneficial, presents some dangers
to smart home and Smart Grid cyber security.

90. Edge Services “will ultimately be provided by electric and gas utilities, as
well as third party service providers in competition with one [an]other.” Frisby &
Trotta, supra note 3, at 303. Third party here refers to those entities who were not
previously involved in the power grid prior to the development of edge services.
91. “Many customers, possibly through aggregators or other energy service
providers, will participate in the retail energy market, thus vastly increasing the
number of participants.” Bosch, supra note 5, at 1358.
92. Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 303.
93. See Peppet, supra note 57, at 109. “SmartThings,” for example, connects
a variety of sensors found in the home, “such as an open/shut sensor (to monitor
doors and windows); a vibration sensor (to monitor knocking on the front door);
a temperature sensor (to control a thermostat); a motion sensor; and a power-outlet
monitor (to turn outlets on and off remotely).” Id.
94. Lance Whitney, Google Closes $3.2 Billion Purchase of Nest, CNET (Feb.
12, 2014, 5:00 AM), cnet.com/news/google-closes-3-2-billion-purchase-of-nest/
[https://perma.cc/ZRH8-3GL5].
95. See Owen Poindexter, The Internet of Things Will Thrive on Energy
Efficiency, GOVTECH.COM (July 28, 2014), govtech.com/fs/news/The-Internet-ofThings-Will-Thrive-On-Energy-Efficiency-.html [ https://perma.cc/B4KK-B5U9 ].
Many feel that Google’s acquisition of Nest will lead to more investments in the IoT
market, as more startups will appear in hopes of following Nest’s path to success. See
id.
96. Id.
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II. THE QUINTESSENTIAL EDGE SERVICE: NEST SMART THERMOSTAT,
CATASTROPHE, AND YOU
Nest, due to its popular smart thermostat,97 adequately highlights the
dangers that edge services and ESPs present to the smart home and the
Smart Grid. Nest is “a smart device designed to control a central air
conditioning unit based on heuristics and learned behavior.”98 Nest can be
remotely controlled through another device, like a smartphone, and it
communicates with other Nest smart devices.99 Lack of interoperability
between smart devices made by different manufacturers is a noted issue
within the smart home.100 However, Nest prides itself on having the ability
to connect and communicate with a multitude of other IoT devices through
its “Works with Nest” program.101 According to Nest, this service allows
a Nest device to interact securely with other devices located inside and
outside of the home.102

97. The term Nest will be used to refer to Nest and its Smart Thermostat
interchangeably. Nest makes other products as well, such as a fire alarm and a home
security
camera. Nest Protect, NEST, nest.com/smoke-co-alarm/meet-nest-protect/
https://perma.cc/VAD8[
] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017); Nest Cam, NEST, nest.com/camera/meetnest-cam/ [https://perma.cc/BM3H-ET3H] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
98. Grant Hernandez et. al, Smart Nest Thermostat: A Smart Spy in Your
Home 2, BLACK HAT (2014), blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-JinSmart-Nest-Thermostat-A-Smart-Spy-In-Your-Home-WP.pdf [https://perma.cc
/H94C-GPQ4]. “Heuristics are criteria, methods, or principles for deciding which
among several alternative courses of action promises to be the most effective in
order to achieve some goal.” JUDEA PEARL, HEURISTICS: INTELLIGENT SEARCH
STRATEGIES FOR COMPUTER PROBLEM SOLVING 3 (1984). A solid description of
Nest and its functions: Nest “tracks your behavior at home to set temperature more
efficiently. The thermostat accepts and records direct user input (e.g., to increase
or decrease temperature) but also contains sensors to sense motion in a room,
ambient light, room temperature, and humidity. All such information is stored on
Nest’s cloud servers and can be accessed and controlled via a user’s smartphone
or other Internet-connected computer.” Peppet, supra note 57, at 108–09.
99. See Hernandez et. al, supra note 98, at 2.
100. Roberto Baldwin, Nest Gets More Smart Home Devices Talking to Each
Other, ENGADGET (Oct. 1, 2015), engadget.com/2015/10/01/works-with-nest-update/
[https://perma.cc/UZ9N-DAAQ
]. Interoperability is an issue that plagues IoT devices in general. Id. In light
of their technical similarities, this is likely the reason why interoperability has
become such a key issue in Smart Grid policy. See supra Part
I.A.2 & Part I.A.3.
101. Works with Nest: How It Works, NEST, nest.com/works-with-nest/
[https://perma.cc/C7MQ-LU4T] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). “Works with Nest”
allows other smart appliances such as Phillips Hue lights and Whirlpool washers and
dryers to connect with the Nest smart home network. Id. Nest also has the ability to
work with many IoT devices, including cars, fans, locks, and smart watches. Id.
102. Id.
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Nest has also partnered up with utility companies and other ESP
service providers. Nest’s affiliation with Ohmconnect in its “Rush Hour”
rewards program provides an illustration.103 The partnership is designed to
help utility companies cut down on demand during peak load hours.104
This program incentivizes customers by paying them a certain sum each
year for efficient energy use,105 which incidentally results in a reduced
energy bill for the customer. The Rush Hour Rewards program also
benefits utility companies because it allows for reduced stress on the grid.
The Rush Hour program works when the customer gives Ohmconnect
authorization to access his or her smart meter and smart devices, like the
Nest Smart Thermostat.106 Once connected, Ohmconnect will
automatically cut back consumption when appropriate to reduce peak
load.107 To accomplish this task, Ohmconnect communicates with the grid
through the smart meter to determine peak load times and uses the Nest
Smart Thermostat to automatically adjust the temperature. Nest offers
customers a right to retain ultimate control. The customer is alerted during
each “rush hour” or spike in the energy load before Nest automatically
begins the process of cutting back energy consumption, giving the
customer the final say in whether to participate in the program or not.108
A. Inherent Vulnerabilities of IoT and CPS: Breeding Ground for a
Kinetic Cyberattack
Even though ESPs, like Nest, are largely unregulated, many argue that
this is beneficial for both smart home and Smart Grid development.109
However, this position is gravely inaccurate. The products that ESPs
provide to consumers suffer from inherent security flaws, which can
ultimately subject homes and the entire grid to a kinetic cyber attack. Much
of a CPS’s functions involve “two-way communication,” meaning that
103. Rush Hour Rewards, NEST, nest.com/energy-partners/#rush-hour [https:
//perma.cc/9X2D-ZMEA] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
104. Id.
105. Klint Finely, The Internet of Anything: The System that Pays You to Use Less
Electricity, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2015, 8:00 PM), wired.com/2015/02/ohmconnect/ [https:
//perma.cc/N2HC-2LP6].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Learn More about Rush Hour Rewards, NEST, nest.com/support/article
/What-is-Rush-Hour-Rewards [https://perma.cc/P35C-F3QE] (last visited Feb. 21,
2017).
109. See Eisen, supra note 18, at 7 (noting that technologies, such as those
involved in the smart home and Smart Grid, can change an entire industry
overnight; thus, it would be advisable to “avoid constraining the grid’s Steve
Jobs” who could make innovations that would make the Smart Grid decades from
now, entirely different from anything contemplated today).
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data and network processes flow in two directions.110 This two-way
communication provides a hacker with more opportunities to manipulate
those communications.111 Consequently, two-way communication
becomes a double-edged sword for Smart Grid development. “[O]n the
one hand, [it] offer[s] savings, convenience, and efficiency, but on the
other hand, it creates dangerous vulnerabilities.”112 Further, cyber security
is not being studied enough, especially in smart home development.113
Thus, important security concerns are overshadowed by the benefits of this
technology for policy makers and ESPs.114
1. Inherent Risks of CPS Technology
CPS security vulnerabilities are studied in two areas: in systems and
devices, and in communication.115 The first area concerns how the devices
that make up a CPS can be attacked through malware, bugs, and other
types of malicious software.116 The second area of study involves methods
that impact communication with the Smart Grid.117 Study in this area is
grounded in the principle that a CPS, by nature, involves a “tightly
interconnected system.” Therefore, as the number of connections between
devices increases, those connections create new communication based
pathways, or vulnerabilities, that could undermine the entire system.118
Two-way communication presents a difficult issue for regulators to
address because of its dual nature. Many scholars note that this technology
fulfills the desire of many participants in the grid who want to remotely
control equipment and devices.119 However, the same technology that
makes remote control of equipment possible “allow[s] attackers a gateway
110. For example, a smart meter facilitates two-way communication between
the utility company and the customer to facilitate smart home scheduling. See Liu
et al., supra note 79.
111. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1364. FERC has stated that “the Smart Grid could
create opportunities for malicious access to Smart Grid devices, which could be
used to disrupt grid functionality.” Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 311.
112. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1365.
113. Security Perspective, supra note 4 (suggesting that that security focus has
generally been more on protecting privacy, opposed to the integrity of a smart
device). See, e.g., id. Persons in the field have stated that IoT consumer devices
where not designed with security in mind. The author used a fitbit as an example
to show that “the device was not engineered with data security in mind.” Peppet,
supra note 57, at 134.
114. Studies in this context reveal that many devices are implemented with
“inadequate level[s] of security measures.” See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
115. Security Perspective, supra note 4.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1364–65.
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into the system.”120 Smart Grid developments can lead to an attack because
of the expensive and uncertain nature of securing the grid.121 Further, some
of the vulnerabilities will not be apparent until they are attacked. A strong
cyber security defense must be strong everywhere to be successful;
whereas an attacker only needs to find a single vulnerability to prevail.122
Thus, security in this context is reactionary to hacks, whether they are
staged by employed internal hackers, or are real attempts by malicious
entities. Additionally, society’s reliance on the grid only increases the
likelihood of an attack.
Cyber attacks are not a thing of fiction. Institutions once perceived to
be impenetrable have experienced hacks that took advantage of this twoway communication. These institutions include: banks, nuclear programs,
stock exchanges, and even electrical utilities.123 However, the threat of a
kinetic cyber attack becomes more likely when the object of the attack is
the power grid, and when the vulnerability of two-way communication is
proliferated by increased efforts to make devices interoperable.124 Twoway communication between the home and the grid is rapidly increasing,
as evidenced by programs like Nest’s Rush Hour rewards.125 Therefore,
continuing this trend will only give more incentive to attack the home in
order to get to the grid.
2. Inherent Risks of IoT Technology
Even though the number of IoT consumer devices in the home have
proliferated over the years, Professor Peppet noted in a recent article that
these devices could be inherently prone to security flaws.126 Isolated
research has been done on the vulnerability of IoT devices. For example,
a worm was discovered by a security firm that “targeted small IoT devices,
particularly home routers, smart televisions, and Internet-connected
security cameras—in addition to traditional computers;”127 all items
currently found in the modern home. Professor Peppet listed several
reasons why IoT devices may be inherently vulnerable to security risks:
(1) they are not designed with security in mind; (2) their small size limits
how much processing power they can have and also restricts implementing
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1364.
122. A “defense needs to be strong everywhere, while the offense only needs
to succeed in one place.” Id.
123. For a detailed discussion of the recent cyberattacks on different industries
across the world, including electrical utilities, see id. at 1363–68.
124. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 and Part II.
125. See supra Part II.
126. Peppet, supra note 57, at 133.
127. Id.
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a large enough battery to support more processing power;128 (3) many do
not have the capability to receive security patch updates once they are sold;
(4) communication between devices can lead to a hack of both devices if
either are compromised;129 and (5) these devices are often manufactured
by producers that are inexperienced with important security issues.130
Admittedly, not all of the risks that Professor Peppet raised may be of
concern for devices in the smart home.131 However, it is important to
consider that these risks are present in general IoT consumer devices. The
smart home is still developing; thus, there is no way to tell what sort of
IoT consumer devices will be in the home in the future, so understanding
the inherent risks of all IoT consumer devices is necessary.
B. Practical Implications of Security Flaws
A study conducted on the Nest Smart Thermostat revealed what
researchers termed “an attack vector” of the Nest’s hardware.132 The
researchers attacked the “boot up,” or power on, process of the Thermostat
by attacking some crucial flaws in one of the Thermostat’s processors.133
Eventually, the researchers were able to turn the Nest Smart Thermostat
into a spy with the capability of determining the inhabitant’s routines, their
cyber activities, and further, providing a backdoor into their local
network.134 Therefore, a hacker could potentially peer into a customer’s
home through the “Nest window” and watch the inhabitants’ every move
for months at a time, completely unnoticed.

128. Increased processing power would allow the devices to support more
security functions. Id.
129. Or, in the very least, it can affect how a consumer uses other devices
related to the infected one. Id. at 134. Using an insulin pump as the example here,
the author noted that the pump and the small monitor that the pump communicates
with wirelessly could be hacked. “Radcliffe has shown that these monitors are
also easily accessed, leading to the possibility that a malicious hacker could cause
a monitor to display inaccurate information, causing a diabetic patient to misadminister insulin doses.” Id.
130. Id. at 135; Peppet, supra note 57, at 134 n.305.
131. Arguably, most IoT devices in the home will at the least be larger than
those considered by Peppet (think a smart fridge versus what Peppet may have
been considering (i.e., a smart watch)). These devices will also likely be
connected to a power outlet, taking care of the problem of energy source for
greater security functions. On the other hand, the increased need of energy for
these appliances could make the device less energy efficient.
132. Hernandez, supra note 98, at 5. Here, an “attack vector,” means a
vulnerability in the device’s cyber security.
133. The researchers used a technique known as “peripheral booting” to attack
gaps the Nest Thermostat’s AM3703 processor. See id.
134. Id.

2017]

SMART HOME ALONE

383

Consequently, a hack of this nature would not only affect the Nest
device, but also other devices on the same network135 because networked
smart devices can be attacked as well.136 This means that hackers can get
into one smart device and affect an entire CPS.137 The implications of such
a hack on a device—like the Nest Smart Thermostat—that connects and
communicates with many other IoT consumer devices in the home is
alarming. Many IoT consumer devices do not reach the level of
interoperability with other devices that Nest does, but Nest shows the
danger of that increased interoperability. Yet, Nest is simply doing what
the market is driving it to do. Federal regulators believe the grid will truly
become beneficial when there is increased interoperability.138 However,
the danger of such a policy becomes apparent if just one device is hacked.
1. Stage One: Attacking the Smart Home
If a Nest Smart Thermostat is used to its upmost potential of
interoperability in a home with a smart meter and full of other non-Nest
IoT devices, the Nest Smart Thermostat becomes the central piece that
connects them all. Thus, the security vulnerabilities of the Nest Thermostat
become that of the other smart devices, regardless of what security
measures the other devices possess. Interestingly, the security
vulnerability is not solely dependent on a flawed product design. Many
times, the vulnerability results from the consumer who has given
authorization to another device or other edge service.139 At this point, it
may not matter that the device connected to the Nest Thermostat is more
secure than the thermostat itself. The consumer has essentially bypassed
that security measure by providing consent to use the two devices in
tandem. Thus, a hack of a Nest Smart Thermostat can easily put the entire
smart home CPS at risk. It is this combination of a device’s security
vulnerability coupled with consumer consent to connect devices that poses
more risk to smart home cyber security.

135. The researchers noted that “[t]he Nest Thermostat backdoor is
exacerbated by the fact that local network credentials are stored on the device and
become accessible to our client software. The extraction of these credentials from
the device imply that we could deploy other rogue devices into the local network,
further shaping local traffic and scanning for exploitable vulnerabilities other
devices in the network may have.” Id.
136. Security Perspective, supra note 4.
137. Id.
138. See SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 77.
139. For example, such authorization that is required for a consumer to participate
in the “Rush Hour Rewards” program.
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A recent bug found in a software update sent out in December 2015,
shows how a malfunctioning Nest can affect a home’s inhabitants.140 The
bug drained the Nest’s battery, causing homeowners nationwide to wake
up in very chilly homes.141 The timing of the glitch could not have been
worse, as the temperature was dropping throughout much of the country.142
As many affected consumers noted, cold temperatures present a health
hazard for buildings with infants and the elderly.143 Since the Nest’s
battery was dead, the only way to fix the issue required a manual nine-step
process, which likely required calling a technician to come out to each
individual home.144 There was no indication that the bug was the result of
some cyber attack; however, it does illustrate how even a simple
malfunction can cause real world problems.
2. Stage Two: Attacking the Smart Grid
The implications of a Nest-like device being hacked become more
frightening when one considers what could happen when Nest connects
with a smart meter. The smart meter is also subject to vulnerabilities of its
own in the form of two recognized cyber attacks: (1) pricing cyber attacks
and (2) energy theft.
a. Pricing Cyberattack
Smart meters use scheduling to help other smart devices and
appliances make decisions about when to use electricity, this is based in
part on when it would be cheapest for the appliance to consume
electricity.145 For scheduling to work, the smart meter receives guidelinepricing data and uses that data accordingly to “schedule” energy
consumption in the home.146 A hacker, such as a neighbor, can manipulate
the guideline pricing data in order to reduce his or her own electricity bill,
and raise the cost of his neighbors’ bill.147 However, this type of attack
could potentially be more malicious if the goal of the hacker goes beyond
simply reducing his or her own energy bill. If the attacker substantially
manipulates the guideline pricing data of multiple homes, he or she can
140. Nick Bilton, Nest Thermostat Glitch Leaves Users in the Cold, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2016, nytimes.com/2016/01/14/fashion/nest-thermostat-glitch-battery-diessoftware-freeze.html?_r=0 [ https://perma.cc/TQB5-TXZ7 ].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
146. Security Perspective, supra note 4.
147. Id.
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create a peak energy load.148 If this “created” peak load is extreme enough,
it could potentially overload the system, leading to a blackout.149
b. Energy Theft
Another type of attack that can affect the grid and the home through
manipulation of the smart meter is known as energy theft. Energy theft occurs
when an attacker “manipulate[s] measurements of energy consumption” in a
way that shows a lower use of energy than actually has been consumed.150 An
attack of this sort would result in a reduced bill for the attacker, but it would
cause the grid to shut down the energy supply, if the energy theft is large
enough. In this instance, the energy load on the grid would be much higher
than what is being communicated via the AMI.151 Although both a pricing
cyber attack and an energy theft can have the same effects on the power grid,
each is initiated differently. Pricing cyber attacks affect pricing-data
communicated over the grid, and an energy theft attacks the measurement data
of energy consumption. The smart meter illustrates how the goal of increasing
interoperability in both smart home and Smart Grid devices greatly foregoes
the inherent cyber security threat that increased two-way communication
presents.
In light of the risks and flaws in both devices, a scenario where the
compromise of an entire home, including the essential smart meter of that
home, because of an attack on the Nest Smart Thermostat, and thus leading
to an entire AMI crashing, is now more realistic. In this scenario, the Nest
communicates with the smart meter, but the smart meter also
communicates with other smart meters and the utility company. There is a
shift at this stage of the Nest cyber attack from a damaging compromise
of an individual’s home to a potential national security threat, all through
the vulnerability of one device. However, this scenario could occur
without a cyber attack. Potentially, the damage could be done if any of the
devices or networks in the Rush Hour program were to malfunction. For
example, an attack of this nature could occur if a smart meter sends
Ohmconnect and Nest the wrong pricing data, which would result in a
collection of Nests in a community to turn on every device in each home
during a peak load hour. Questions arise as to the effects that such
malfunctions in one CPS can have on another CPS absent a cyber attack.
Even if Nest fixes this vulnerability, which is likely, it gives a practical
illustration of how things can go from bad, to worse, to catastrophic, when
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Rajkumar, supra note 51.
Security Perspective, supra note 4.
Id.
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a single device that specializes in two-way communication is hacked due
to a security flaw. This hypothetical Nest hack highlights the potential
danger of the two-way communication that makes CPSs and IoT devices
so popular. Without oversight, and if left up to market pressures, ESPs,
especially startups, likely will not invest in costly security measures. Even
if ESPs invest in proper security measures, the threat of those measures
being bypassed by the mere act of a consumer that connects a less secure
device always poses a risk.
III. FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: GAPS IN THE CURRENT LAW
Considering the expected growth of the edge service market and the
dangers that edge services present, the state of the current regulatory
landscape is troubling. Smart Grid regulation has proven to be problematic
due to its complex and novel legal issues.152 Because of the technological
similarities,153 the regulatory issues surrounding the smart home expose a
portion of the problems surrounding Smart Grid regulation as a whole.
Current regulation suffers from two important deficiencies: (1) lack of
clear jurisdiction over ESPs and (2) voluntary adoption of federal
standards. Regulation that affects the home is primarily focused with
ensuring fair pricing for consumers.154 However, edge services and ESPs
are significantly restructuring the home’s role within the grid,155 and these
new services greatly impact Smart Grid security.156 Further, current efforts
for developing federal cyber security standards have only resulted in
voluntary adoption.157 Presently, the issue of cyber security has been left
to the states, opening the potential to a patchwork of standards.158

152. “Smart Grid development presents a variety of novel and practical legal
issues that involve a multitude of regulatory jurisdictions, federal departments and
agencies, and state authorities.” Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 304–05.
153. See supra Part I.B.
154. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ENERGY REGULATION IN THE
US: A GUIDE 5–6 (2011) (describing how utilities and the government have entered
into a “regulatory compact” in order to ensure the “provision of safe, adequate, and
reliable service at prices (or revenues) that are sufficient, but no more than sufficient
to compensate the regulated firm for the costs…that it incurs to fulfill its obligation to
serve.); see also id. at 25 (stating that the “first and best established functions of the
state commission are to . . . establish the prices or rates for each class of consumers.”).
155. See supra Part I.D.
156. See supra Part II.
157. See Bosch, supra note 5, at 1377.
158. “Without national standards, 51 different state public utility commissions
(“PUCs”) could adopt 51 different Smart Grid models, or implement systems that fail
to protect the grid from cyberattacks.” Eisen, supra note 18, at 4.
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A. Lack of Clear Jurisdiction over ESPs
The current regulatory environment does not provide any entity with
jurisdiction over ESPs, like Nest, or its activities as it relates to the energy
field. FERC likely does not have authority over edge services and ESPs,
since these services do not involve interstate wholesale of electricity or
interstate transmission of electricity. Arguably, edge services could fall
under FERC’s authority to create reliability standards because the
vulnerability of an edge service can affect the bulk power system.
However, FERC’s jurisdictional authority to enforce such standards is
limited to the bulk power system;159 unfortunately, the scope of the bulk
power system is not clear.160 Even if ESPs did fall within the scope of the
reliability standards development, NERC’s interpretation that reliability
standards do not include telecommunication systems or communication
paths161 would make jurisdiction ineffective. FERC could also have
authority over ESPs under EISA, but FERC has interpreted EISA in a way
that does not give it the power to “mandate or enforce these standards.”162
Further, the extent that EISA extends FERC’s jurisdiction is still a matter
of debate, and the process for developing interoperability standards has
only been invoked once since EISA has been enacted.163
However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in FERC v.
Electric Power Supply Ass’n,164 may greatly change this calculus. The
Court dealt with FERC’s Order No. 745, which attempted to ensure that
demand response programs165 (programs similar to that of Ohmconnect)
are compensated at the same rate as traditional electricity generators.166
Opponents of FERC’s order argued that “FERC has no jurisdiction under
159. See 16 U.S.C. § 824o(e).
160. Andreas S. V. Wokutch, The Role of Non-Utility Service Providers in Smart
Grid Development: Should They Be Regulated, and if So, Who Can Regulate Them?,
9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 531, 549 (2011) (“It is unclear what is
considered a local distribution facility and what is considered part of the bulk power
system.”).
161. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1379.
162. Wokutch, supra note 160, at 551.
163. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1382.
164. 136 S. Ct. 760, 193 L. Ed. 2d 661 (2016), as revised (Jan. 28, 2016).
165. A demand response program is one in which “operators of wholesale markets
pay electricity consumers for commitments not to use power at certain times.” Id. at
767 (emphasis original).
166. Stephen J. Humes, Supreme Court Walks Energy Policy Tightrope As It
Addresses Federalism and States’ Rights, 4 ABA TRENDS 7, March/April 2016; Gavin
Bade, Updated: Supreme Court upholds FERC Order 745, affirming federal role in
demand response, UTILITY DIVE, Jan. 25, 2016, utilitydive.com/news/updatedsupreme-court-upholds-ferc-order-745-affirming-federal-role-in-de/412668/ [https:
//perma.cc/96Q5-Z4WE].
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the FPA over the electric consumption of end-use customers at their homes
or places of business.”167 The rationale behind the argument was that the
FPA gives FERC jurisdiction over wholesale electricity, but not over
demand response programs.168 Opponents believed that demand response
programs are an issue of retail sales, which is within the jurisdiction of the
states.169 The Court disagreed, holding that “[w]hen FERC regulates what
takes place on the wholesale market, as part of carrying out its charge to
improve how that market runs, then no matter the effect on retail sales, [the
FPA] imposes no bar.”170 The Court reasoned that “the wholesale and retail
markets in electricity . . . are not hermetically sealed from each other . . . ”
and transactions that occur on either market can affect the other.171
As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, there is now
precedent establishing FERC’s ability to extend its jurisdiction into areas
traditionally regulated by the state. However, it is too early to tell how far
this holding can be extended. There are already some limitations present
in this holding, namely, FERC’s actions only indirectly affected the state’s
jurisdiction.172 Further, this decision, for purposes of this comment, only
dealt with pricing, not cyber security measures. Thus, although Electric
Power Supply Ass’n., presents a step in the right direction in extending
FERC’s jurisdiction, its limitations prohibit it from establishing clear and
direct jurisdiction over all ESPs and edge services.
PUCs, similarly, do not have clear jurisdiction over ESPs.173 PUCs
only have the authority to regulate interactions between utilities and
consumers, which do not contemplate third party interactions involving
ESPs.174 A PUC’s authority revolves intimately around the regulation of
“public utilities,” and ESPs are likely not considered public utilities.175
There is evidence to counter a PUC’s lack of jurisdiction since some states,
such as California, have enacted legislation that affects ESPs. Once the
third party ESP receives data from a utility company, California law shifts
liability to ESPs.176 Even if states have authority to regulate, it would only

167. Humes, supra note 166, at 8; FERC, 136 S. Ct. at 767 (stating that one of the
issues facing the Court was “does the FPA permit FERC to regulate these demand
response transactions at all, or does any such rule impinge on the State’s authority”).
168. Humes, supra note 166, at 8.
169. Id.
170. FERC, 136 S. Ct. at 776.
171. Id.
172. Bade, supra note 166; Humes, supra note 166, at 8.
173. See Wokutch, supra note 160, at 552–55.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 553–54.
176. Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 326 (citing California S.B. 1476 (2010)
(Chapter 497, Statutes of 2010)).
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mean that edge services would fall into the same patchwork of voluntary
federal standards that utility cyber security standards fall under.
Likewise, DOE’s limited authority in this area makes it unlikely that
it has authority to regulate ESPs. DOE has the power to create entities that
would help lead to Smart Grid development, not to regulate such
development. 177 The FCC potentially has the authority to regulate ESPs,
but is unlikely to do so.178 FCC was granted some authority in the Smart
Grid realm under the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act; however,
it has interpreted its role as one of “guidance and assistance rather than
active involvement.”179 Power grid regulation already involves an
awkward relationship between PUCs and FERC, and adding another
entity, such as the FCC or DOE, will only further complicate things.
B. Lack of Nationwide Cybersecurity Standards
Even if Congress were to establish jurisdiction over ESPs, the lack of
mandatory federal cyber security standards would still present a problem.
FERC’s authority to enforce cyber security measures does not apply to all
entities, nor does it apply at every stage of the power grid.180 NERC’s
interpretation of its mandate to create reliability standards181 is also
troubling in light of the issues that two-way communication presents to the
Smart Grid. The lack of mandatory standards makes the risk of a kinetic
cyber attack more probable and only highlights the need for greater cyber
security measures in the grid.
EISA potentially extends FERC’s jurisdiction to enforce cyber
security measures based on FERC’s interpretation of its authority under
the act. FERC has interpreted that the standards it adopts will be applicable
to devices and markets at the local and intrastate level.182 FERC’s
interpretation would extend its jurisdiction to an area of the power grid
that has generally been the realm of PUCs.183 Consequently, opponents of
FERC’s interpretation noted that any attempt to actually exercise this new

177. Wokutch, supra note 160, at 555–57.
178. Id. at 558.
179. Id. at 557.
180. See supra Part I.A.2. For example, local distribution systems are
expressly left out of FERC’s jurisdictional authority. 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(1)(B).
181. See supra Part III.A.
182. See Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 37098, 37101, para. 22 (Jul. 27,
2009) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. ch. I); Bosch, supra note 5, at 1381–82.
183. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1381–82.
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power would be met with hostility.184 As a result, the law is at a stalemate,
and FERC has yet to mandate any interoperability standards.185
The failure of the interoperability adoption process under EISA
presents another roadblock to the adoption of mandatory federal standards.
NIST has failed to produce any standards that meet the “sufficient
consensus” requirement of FERC.186 In fact, since EISA’s enactment,
NIST attempted this process only once and failed.187 Nevertheless, NIST
has continued to work with SGIP to develop voluntary standards and put
together reports relating to cyber security of communication interfaces in
the Smart Grid.188 However, the process of interoperability adoption has
proven to be ineffective. Thus, even if accepted by FERC, the
enforceability of these standards is likely to be questioned.189
A study by Congressmen Edward Markey and Henry Waxman shows
how ineffective a voluntary regime is in this area.190 The report done on
NERC’s voluntary and mandatory standards revealed that the majority of
utilities only implemented the mandatory standards.191 A voluntary
adoption regime can be successful in some instances, but Smart Grid cyber
security is an issue of national security and should not be left up to such a
regime.192 Also, with the development of cyber security standards lying in
the hands of the states, there is the possibility of fifty-one193 different
184. “If FERC attempted to change the existing distribution of authority
between it and the states (for example, by setting national interoperability
standards that the states would be required to force utilities to adopt in individual
projects), it could exacerbate the well-documented tension between the federal
and state governments in electric utility regulation.” Eisen, supra note 18, at 21.
185. FERC did note that “adoption of any Smart Grid standard under EISA
does not make the standard mandatory, nor does EISA give FERC authority to
require the development of any Smart Grid standard. Any Commission authority
to make Smart Grid standards mandatory, or to allow rate recovery of Smart Grid
cost must derive from its existing authority under the FPA [which has been
replaced by the EPAct].” Frisby & Trotta, supra note 3, at 310. “The commission
added that adoption of national standards for Smart Grid technologies and
standards should enhance policy choices available to states, and should not
interfere with states’ abilities to adopt certain advanced metering or demand
response programs.” Id.
186. Bosch, supra note 5, at 1382.
187. Id.
188. Id. Fifty-six voluntary standards have been approved by SGIP and are
included in their catalog of standards. Id.
189. Wokutch, supra note 160, at 551.
190. See STAFF OF CONGRESSMEN EDWARD J. MARKEY & HENRY A. WAXMAN,
ELECTRIC GRID VULNERABILITY: INDUSTRY RESPONSES REVEAL SECURITY GAPS 12
(2013), markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Markey%20Grid%20Report_05.21.131
.pdf [https://perma.cc/S37V].
191. Id.
192. See Bosch, supra note 5, at 1377.
193. A federal model and fifty state models.
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models for cyber security, which could collectively fail to protect the
grid.194 Further, developing cyber security standards without establishing
jurisdiction over ESPs will weaken the entire framework due to the
inherent risks of edge services.195 Both the voluntary adoption regime and
lack of jurisdiction over ESPs must be addressed in order for the Smart
Grid to be successful. Instead, the current regime focuses on policy aimed
at furthering the adoption and development of new Smart Grid
technology.196 Continuing to ignore the voluntary nature and lack of
jurisdiction of the current regime creates a breeding ground for a kinetic
cyber attack.
The development of the smart home relies on the continued
development of IoT devices. Despite the inherent risks of IoT devices, the
fact that the home is the area where ESPs are the most active is what truly
makes smart home development dangerous. If these concerns are not
properly addressed, the growth of the smart home will be stunted, and in
turn, so will the growth of the Smart Grid. If customers do not trust the
technology that is necessary for the continued growth of the smart home
and Smart Grid, both will inevitably fail. While some industry leaders
claim to be cognizant of the need to address these security concerns, 197
important cyber security considerations are still overlooked.198 This
oversight can be traced to a number of factors199 and has important
consequences. If a Nest-like device compromises other devices it
communicates with and leads to physical harm, there is no clear way to
determine the extent of the ESPs’ liability.200 Accordingly, the thought of
leaving ESPs free to follow market pressures in developing cyber security
194. Eisen, supra note 18, at 4.
195. See discussion supra Part II.
196. See generally Energy Independence and Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
17001–17386 (2007).
197. Nest Founder, Tony Fadell, stated that “[the Nest Thermostat] will never
take off if people don’t trust it.” Hernandez et al., supra note 98, at 1.
198. Security Perspective, supra note 4, at 1.
199. For one, many developers of IoT consumer devices are startups with limited
capital and are unable to afford proper security measures. See Hernandez et al., supra
note 98. A second factor relates to IoT device design flow. According to researchers,
security measures likely do not extend beyond the application and network level,
meaning that “designers often treat IoT and wearable devices as standard networked
devices and try to apply the security protections developed for regular, everyday use
computing devices.” Id. at 1. This vulnerability in design flow can be used to upload
malicious firmware into the software of an IoT device. Id.
200. With regard to liability, the service agreements of many companies like Nest
limits a customer’s remedy to arbitration. See Terms of Service, NEST, nest.com
/legal/terms-of-service/ [https://perma.cc/8SEH-4VHF] (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
The customer must give up the right to seek a remedy in court or to join a class action.
Id. Many have categorized the terms of such agreements as very unfriendly to
consumers. See Bilton, supra note 140.
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measures should be extremely alarming, but the current regulatory regime
has not established clear jurisdiction over ESPs. Further, even if they did,
ESPs would enter a regime where cyber security measures are not
mandatory.
IV. CRAFTING A SOLUTION
The issues surrounding the smart home by no means include all of the
problems with current Smart Grid development. Given the inadequate
cyber security standards and the multiple actors involved in regulation, the
entire structure of the power grid regulatory regime needs to be addressed.
However, restructuring the current regime will take a significant amount
of time and effort. Further, at this early stage of development, mandatory
and stringent regulation may not be possible or desirable. The smart home,
and the Smart Grid are still developing, and making premature laws
regarding cyber security would not be wise. With that said, as a matter of
policy, the security of the smart home and oversight of ESPs and their
services must be considered a priority in ongoing development. This new
smart home policy should be geared toward several goals that will be
discussed in part.
A. Defining the Smart Grid and Establishing FCC Authority
First, the lack of definitions surrounding of the Smart Grid realm hurts
regulatory efforts.201 Accordingly, the first goal in progressing smart home
cyber security is crafting clear definitions of the categories of services,
devices, actors, and the relationships between these and traditional202
entities in the growing smart home infrastructure. Developing and
implementing standards or regulations will be ineffective and almost
impossible to draft without first completely understanding the object of
the standards. Therefore, the first step should be accomplished by forming
a coalition of relevant federal agencies and ESP industry leaders that
would study the smart home industry, create reports based on these studies,
and ultimately suggest uniform standards. Among these industry leaders,
it is vital that companies like Google, Microsoft and Whirlpool take part.
However, actively engaging the FCC in the process will be more
important. The FCC has expertise in telecommunications and broadband
Internet, and their expertise would play an important role in the
development of the smart home.

201. See supra Part I.
202. Such as traditional utility companies.
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Thus, Congress should give the FCC the primary responsibility of
overseeing ESPs and edge services and crafting clear definitions, at least
until the power grid regulatory regime is restructured. This step should not
be difficult to implement, since this model is essentially already in place
with regard to the development of the rest of the Smart Grid
infrastructure.203
B. Enforceable Cyber Security Standards for ESPs
The second goal of developing a smart home policy should be the
crafting of enforceable federal standards for ESPs. Many of the roadblocks
to mandatory standards for utility companies are not present in the realm
of edge services. The edge service market is a new, developing market
with no clear regulatory authority in place, so there is no jurisdictional
battle impeding these standards or their enforcement. However, wholesale
regulation may not be appropriate because it may do more to damage the
development of the smart home than to protect it. It is important to keep
in mind the policy of promoting development of the Smart Grid and the
newly proposed policy of securing the smart home. These policies should
complement, not detract from, one another. Oversight of ESPs should
emphasize to smart appliance developers and legislators that the industry’s
success requires more than greater interoperability. People have to trust
this technology in order for the industry and the Smart Grid to grow.
Therefore, it is essential that the technology should not make people feel
less secure in their homes.
Oversight in this realm may take the form of a system that is analogous
to the Underwriters Laboratories’ standards.204 This model would involve
the creation of mandatory security standards for appliances that have the
potential to communicate with the grid directly or through second-hand
communication.205 An example of a mandatory security standard would be
203. The purpose of this step is just to put added emphasis on the smart home
in light of the issues discussed.
204. Underwriters Lab is a private organization that is well established in multiple
countries that comes up with standards for appliances that plug in to the grid that
promote protection of grid and the appliance (i.e., surge protectors). Underwriters Lab
is one of the few companies that is approved by the U.S. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration to perform safety testing. See, e.g., Standards, UNDERWRITERS
LABORATORIES, ulstandards.ul.com/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2017); Underwriters
Laboratories, Inc., inc.com/encyclopedia/underwriters-laboratories-ul.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2017).
205. Direct communication would involve direct communication with a device
like a smart meter. Second-hand communication would involve a device that has
intermediary between it and the smart meter, for example a device that communicates
with the Nest Smart Thermostat, and the Nest Smart Thermostat communicates with
the smart meter.
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that a device must have the ability to receive software patch updates in a
way similar that a smartphone receives updates. Understandably, these
mandatory security standards will increase the costs for ESPs to enter and
stay in the market. Therefore, costs and effects in the market will need to
be considered in crafting these standards, but the greater interest is to
protect the nation and individual consumers; thus, it should not give way
to market pressures.
C. Liability Framework
In light of the possibility of market effects by mandatory security
standards and the likelihood that the threat of hacks will always be
present,206 the third goal should be the creation of a liability scheme in the
event that a kinetic attack occurs. The liability scheme would have
multiple stages of punishment for ESPs who do not comply with the
mandatory standards and whose devices lead to the kinetic attack.
The liability scheme would be broken down into three levels based on
compliance with the mandatory standards. The first level would afford
ESPs the most protection from liability. This stage would be applicable to
those ESPs who fully comply with the mandatory standards imposed on
them. Since it will be a government-led coalition that creates these
standards, if the security of devices fail, then the government should bear
the majority of the burden. However, the burden of liability will not solely
be on the government, since an ESP can always adopt higher standards as
it is able and feels necessary.
The second level would apply to those ESPs who do not fully adopt
the mandatory standards. This level would deal with the reality that not
every ESP would be able to afford the security measures that are made
mandatory. The second level would also serve to increase competition and
development in this field. Thus, as long as the ESP engages in certain
activities that meet a minimum threshold of appropriate cyber security,207
the ESP can still participate in the development of smart home products.
Further, the ESP’s liability, in the event of an attack, would be mitigated
based on the ESP’s security practices. However, to encourage adoption of
the mandatory standards, ESPs would suffer some sort of financial
penalty.208
206. A “defense need to be strong everywhere, while the offense only needs
to succeed in one place.” Bosch, supra note 5, at 1364.
207. For example, having a team of internal hackers constantly checking for
flaws in security, which could potentially be cheaper than meeting government
mandatory standards.
208. Financial penalties could take the form of a tax every two to five years
ESPs do not adopt the standards.
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The third and final level applies to those ESPs who do not adopt the
mandatory standards or adopt voluntary practices of the second level. In
this level, the ESP cannot engage in the sale of IoT consumer devices, and
in the event that they somehow get a device into the home and that device
is used to conduct a kinetic cyber attack, the ESP will have no shield of
liability.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of the smart home is an important development in
human history, but it is not without its dangers. The new industry is
developing around the smart home, edge services, and the technology
being used to make the smart home a reality, IoT and CPS, present both
benefits and inherent risks to individuals in the home and the nation. The
threat of a kinetic cyber attack on the grid via the smart home is
technologically possible and probable. Thus, as a policy matter, smart
home cyber security needs to become a priority and security standards
need to be developed. Equally important is keeping in mind the practical
limitations of such standards. Hacks and malfunctions in these devices are
inevitable, and imposing these standards on ESPs may not always be
economically feasible. Therefore, a liability framework should also be
adopted to incentivize acceptance of standards but to also shield ESPs in
the event of a kinetic cyber attack. No solution to such a complex problem
is perfect, but this solution achieves the appropriate balance to begin
solving the problems surrounding the Smart Grid. The smart home cannot
be left alone any longer.
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